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Abstract
The April 16, 2007 mass casualty incident at Virginia Tech had an imme-
diate, significant, and enduring impact on approaches to campus safety in 
the United States. In the aftermath of the incident, there were numerous 
campus safety reviews, not only at Virginia Tech, but across the Common-
wealth of Virginia, across the nation, and around the world. Those reviews 
by campus administrations, state and federal government agencies, profes-
sional associations, victim advocacy groups, and law enforcement bodies, 
resulted in hundreds of campus safety recommendations. Many of those 
recommendations were intended to improve reactive aspects of physical se-
curity, emergency preparedness, law enforcement response, and emergency 
notification. However, several recommendations addressed preventative ap-
proaches to enhance campus safety and bolster institutions’ capabilities to 
identify, investigate, assess and manage actual and potential threats of vi-
olence to the campus community. This article will summarize the changes 
in approaches to behavioral threat assessment and management among in-
stitutions of higher education in the United States, drawing on the lessons 
confirmed and learned from the Virginia Tech incident and those that fol-
lowed through various research efforts. 
Keywords: threat assessment, higher education, United States, Virginia 
Tech  
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On April 16, 2007, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University (Virginia Tech) committed a horrific, mass-casualty attack 
that resulted in the deaths of 32 people, and the wounding or injuring 
of another 27 persons. The seriousness of the incident drew signifi-
cant attention to campus safety and a review of the capabilities of in-
stitutions of higher education to prepare for (and respond to) such in-
cidents, to provide timely warnings to community members regarding 
significant ongoing dangers, and to physically secure campus build-
ings. As further information became available regarding both the per-
petrator’s background and behavior prior to the attack, and the insti-
tutions’ response to his behavior; colleges and universities engaged 
in significant systematizing of their campus systems to enable them 
to better identify and intervene with persons’ who were engaging in 
concerning and threatening behavior (Midwestern Higher Education 
Compact, 2008). 
Summary of the Incident at Virginia Tech 
Shortly after 7:10 a.m. on April 16, 2007, a then-unknown perpetra-
tor shot two victims (both students) in West Ambler Johnson Resi-
dence Hall on the Virginia Tech campus. Both victims died as a result 
of their injuries. Approximately 2 hr and 40 min later, the (still un-
known) perpetrator chained the interior handles of the entry doors to 
Norris Hall, a classroom and laboratory building near the center of the 
campus. He then went to the second floor of the building where sev-
eral classes were in session. He looked into several of the classrooms 
before initiating his attack and then entered one of the classrooms, 
shooting and killing the professor and then killing or wounding most 
of the students in the classroom. He then proceeded to other class-
rooms along the hallway, killing and wounding where ever he gained 
access, often returning to the same room multiple times. Nearly all 
the victims suffered multiple gunshot wounds, some as many as 17. In 
approximately 11 min, the perpetrator had fired over 170 rounds from 
two semiautomatic pistols. As responding law enforcement officers 
gained entry to the building and advanced to the second floor to con-
front him, the perpetrator took his own life. Investigation would show 
that he had fired 174 rounds and that he still had over 200 rounds of 
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unexpended ammunition at the time that he killed himself (Virginia 
Governor’s Panel Report, 2007). 
In all, 32 persons were killed during the incident— two in West Am-
bler Johnson, and 30 in Norris Hall. During the Norris Hall portion of 
the attack, the perpetrator also shot another 17 persons, all of whom 
survived their injuries. At least 10 students were seriously injured as 
they escaped one of the classrooms through the second story windows. 
Within Norris Hall during the attack were another 100 or more fac-
ulty, staff, or students who were not physically injured but were ex-
posed to the horrific consequences of the attack (Virginia Governor’s 
Panel Report, 2007). 
Lessons Confirmed and Learned: Policy and Practice 
Reviews of the Virginia Tech Incident 
The community, and the nation, were horrified by the attack. In the 
aftermath, there was tremendous support for the Virginia Tech com-
munity. There were also strong questions about how such a tragedy 
could have occurred and what, if anything, could be done to prevent 
such an incident or to mitigate harm. Charles Steger, President of 
Virginia Tech, commissioned several internal committees to review 
various aspects campus safety and security. These include aspects 
of physical security, emergency preparedness, emergency commu-
nications, student conduct policies, student mental health services, 
law enforcement and emergency medical services response to the 
incident, and how the university had dealt with the perpetrator in 
the years prior to the incident (Blythe, 2007; Hyatt, 2007; Niles, 
2007). Those committees identified several areas for modification 
of institutional policy and practices related to campus safety and se-
curity systems, policies, and practices. The internal reviews found 
that there were significant points of contact with the perpetrator 
(prior to the incident) in which other faculty, staff, or students had 
concerns about his behavior or about his welfare. The reviews also 
found that many people misunderstood laws and policies regarding 
sharing of information and that this had contributed to people not 
reporting concerns. This, along with the fragmented and compart-
mentalized information regarding the subject, lead to no entity on 
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campus having a full understanding of the nature of his concerns or 
the impact of his behavior. The committees outlined several recom-
mendations to address these concerns, including: 
• Creating a threat assessment team charged with examining the 
most complex cases of distressed students and empowering it to 
act quickly, when necessary. 
• Expanding case management capacity by adding case managers to 
the Dean of Students office and Cook Counseling Center to im-
prove follow-up with students and to improve information flow 
through appropriate units about students at risk. 
• Improve communications in the systems with particular emphasis 
on privacy law education throughout the university, clarifying 
policies for communications with external agencies, establish-
ing a central university contact with a clear picture of distressed 
students (Hincker, 2007). 
In addition, and at the request of President Steger, the Governor of 
Virginia appointed a panel of experts to conduct an external review of 
the incident, the perpetrator, and university and community services 
with whom the perpetrator had interacted. The Virginia Tech Review 
Panel offered over 70 recommendations directed to both Virginia Tech 
and to Virginia campuses broadly. Among the recommendations were 
several related to identification and intervention of subjects who may 
pose a threat to the campus. Specifically, the Panel recommended that 
“Virginia Tech and other institutions of higher learning should have 
a threat assessment team that includes representatives from law en-
forcement, human resources, student and academic affairs, legal coun-
sel, and mental health functions” (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, 
p. 19). The panel further recommended that “Incidents of aberrant, 
dangerous, or threatening behavior must be documented and reported 
immediately to a college’s threat assessment group, and must be acted 
upon in a prompt and effective manner to protect the safety of the 
campus community” (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, p. 53). These 
recommendations were fully consistent with the finding from the Vir-
ginia Tech internal reviews and would subsequently guide legislation 
in Virginia (discussed further below). 
In addition to the reviews noted above, the Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) for the Virginia Department of Mental Health, Mental 
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Retardation & Substance Abuse Services (Stewart, 2007) conducted a 
postincident review of the services provided through state facilities or 
health care providers. The report summarized various points of con-
tact with the subject who ultimately committed the mass shooting at 
Virginia Tech. That summary was represented in a diagram (recreated 
in Figure 1 below) that outline the fragmented and scattered points of 
concern that had existing regarding the subject during the Fall semes-
ter of 2005, nearly 18 months prior to the attack. That diagram helped 
emphasize the difficulty in identifying and intervening effectively with 
developing concerns when information was compartmentalized. The 
lack of a centralized resource to gather such concerns, and then ana-
lyze and act upon them as appropriate, significantly inhibited the or-
ganization’s ability to detect and respond to developing concerns. 
In addition to the internal communication challenges that limited 
opportunities for intervention with the subject, the OIG review (Stew-
art, 2007) also pointed out the shortcomings of approaches to clinical 
assessment of dangerousness based primarily or solely on informa-
tion provided by the subject of the evaluation. The review scrutinized 
the process by which the subject had been evaluated during an invol-
untary hospitalization that had occurred in December 2005, follow-
ing suicidal comments made to others. The review found that some 
evaluators had relied primarily on intake documentation and brief 
Figure 1. Diagram of communications regarding the individual within the Vir-
ginia Tech Community, Fall, 2005. Prepared based upon graphic in OIG Report 
#140–07: Investigation of the April 16, 2007 Critical Incident at Virginia Tech. 
Office of the Inspector General for Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Sub-
stance Abuse Services, Commonwealth of Virginia.  
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interviews with the subject to assess the danger he posed to self or 
others. The review stated: 
psychiatric evaluation and assessment using sufficient collateral 
information to ensure an accurate understanding of the individ-
ual, the individual’s environment, his recent behaviors, and the 
context of the psychological crisis that precipitated the psychi-
atric emergency which warranted a temporary detention order. 
(Stewart, 2007, p. 33)  
Dr. Aradhana Bela Sood, a psychiatrist who was also one of the 
members of the Virginia Tech Review Panel addressed similar con-
cerns in her book (Sood & Cohen, 2015). No such comprehensive and 
collaborative evaluation was done with the subject from Virginia Tech 
nor is such an approach to evaluation typical across acute psychiatric 
settings (Giggie, 2015). While proactive threat assessment and man-
agement of persons exhibiting concerning behavior on campus re-
mains important, where mental health concerns are concurrent and 
contributory to violence risk, and lead to acute evaluation, there needs 
to be a similar integrated collaborative approach in assessing and 
managing violence risk among patients. The Governor’s Panel recom-
mended that “The role and responsibilities of the independent evalua-
tor in the commitment process should be clarified and steps taken to 
assure that the necessary reports and collateral information are as-
sembled before the independent evaluator conducts the evaluation” 
(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, p. 61). In Virginia and across the 
nation, work remains to be done to meet this standard. 
State or System Campus Safety Reviews 
The Virginia Tech internal reviews and the Governors Review Panel 
would serve as foundation and stimulus for other states (e.g., Arkan-
sas, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ne-
vada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Wisconsin) to conduct similar re-
views of campus safety issues (see the Appendix for a listing of some 
of those reviews). Indeed, approximately 1 year after the tragedy, a 
national survey of over 330 institutions of higher education found 
that 87% had already completed a comprehensive review of campus 
safety and security concerns that had resulted in changes to safety pol-
icies, procedures, or systems (Midwestern Higher Education Compact, 
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2008). Nearly all of the reviews recommended that institutions of 
higher education implement campus threat assessment teams (In-
ternational Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators 
[IACLEA], 2008; O’Neill et al., 2008). 
Legislative Approaches 
The Commonwealth of Virginia became the first state to legislate a 
statutory requirement for public (state owned and supported by gov-
ernment taxes) institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth 
to “implement policies and procedures for the prevention of violence 
on campus, including assessment and intervention with individuals 
whose behavior poses a threat to the safety of the campus commu-
nity” (Virginia, 2008). Campuses are required to: 
1. Provide guidance to faculty, staff, and students regarding 
threatening or unusual behavior. 
2. Identify means and members of the institution where commu-
nity members should report concerning behavior. 
3. Establish policies and procedures for reporting of concerns. 
4. Establish policies and procedures for assessing and intervening 
with individuals engaging in threatening behavior. 
The statute further requires public campuses to develop, imple-
ment, and operate threat assessment teams. The threat assessment 
teams must include (at minimum) members from law enforcement; 
professionals from mental health, student affairs, and human re-
sources; and (as available) legal counsel. Note that many campuses 
in Virginia (and across the United States) have their own campus po-
lice or law enforcement agency. Where this is not the case, campuses 
would develop agreements with local law enforcement agencies to ful-
fill the proscribed role. The teams are charged with the authority and 
responsibility to implement the violence prevention and intervention 
policies established by the campuses. 
In 2008, following a mass casualty incident at Northern Illinois 
University, the Illinois Legislature enacted a statute requiring public 
and private (not state owned) institutions within Illinois to develop 
and implement a campus threat assessment team (Illinois Campus Se-
curity Enhancement 110 ILCS 12/20, 2008). 
Deisinger & Scalora in J.  of  Threat Assessment & Mgmt.  2016   8
Similarly, in 2013, following the mass casualty incident at Sandy 
Hook Elementary School, the Connecticut legislature (Connecticut, 
2013) enacted legislation requiring both state and independent in-
stitutions of higher education to establish threat assessment teams. 
Following the mass casualty incident at Sandy Hook Elementary 
School, the Governor of Virginia appointed a School and Campus 
Safety Task Force to review safety concerns impacting elementary 
and secondary schools, as well as institutions of higher education. The 
Task Force made several recommendations, including that the Assem-
bly of Virginia extend the existing threat assessment statutes to be in-
clusive of public school divisions in Virginia. In July of 2013, Virginia 
became the first state in the nation to require behavioral threat as-
sessment and management teams in all of public education, from kin-
dergarten to postgraduate education (Virginia, 2013). 
Standards of Practice 
Well before the Virginia Tech incident there were established ap-
proaches, models, and guidance for dealing with persons exhibiting 
concerning behavior or who posed a threat to the educational com-
munity. Delworth (1989) outlined a framework for improving institu-
tional responses to students with complex behavioral and emotional 
concerns. The assessment–intervention of student problems (AISP) 
model was ahead of its time in recognizing the need for collaborative 
and systematic approaches. Delworth noted that 
[a]ll campuses have or should have some system in place for han-
dling the discipline or judicial problems and the psychological 
problems of students. The issue often becomes one of insufficient 
coordination, inadequate informational flow, and a lack of shared 
process. (Delworth, 1989, p. 9) 
While not specifically about students who posed a threat of vio-
lence, her comments on the challenges faced in addressing such con-
cerns, were remarkably prescient. Deisinger and colleagues drew 
from Delworth’s model in their development and implementation of 
a threat assessment team at Iowa State University during the 1993–
94 academic year (Jaeger, Deisinger, Houghton, & Cychosz, 1993). 
Dunkle, Silverstein, and Warner (2008) outlined and further adapted 
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Delworth’s model specifically for use both as a campus threat assess-
ment team, as well as for an approach to maximizing effectiveness in 
responding to students with complex mental health concerns. 
Following a violent incident at Concordia College in Montreal Can-
ada in 1992, the institution’s Board of Governors commissioned a re-
view lead by Dr. John Cowan. The 1994 Cowan report provided an in-
depth review of the case facts and timeline. The report also identified 
several issues including the need for a central clearinghouse of infor-
mation to improve institutional memory and awareness of long-term 
behavioral concerns, the need to formalize existing crisis management 
processes to enhance their effectiveness, reduce compartmentaliza-
tion of awareness of concerns and related decision making, the need 
for coordination and collective decision making regarding critical is-
sues (Cowan, 1994). Cowan’s findings would be replicated in many of 
the campus safety reviews that followed the Virginia Tech incident. 
Following the mass casualty incident at Columbine High School in 
April 1999, several agencies and organizations reviewed issues related 
to school and workplace safety, many of which parallel the issues and 
challenges faced by institutions of higher education. Mohandie (2000) 
published a comprehensive guide to conducting threat assessment in 
elementary and secondary school. Also, Meloy (2000) summarized the 
existing literature on targeted violence as well as approaches to the 
assessment and management of cases across sectors. Vossekuil, Fein, 
Reddy, Borum, and Modzeleski (2002) conducted a review of school 
shootings that had occurred over several years and identified several 
behaviors relevant to identifying risk for escalation of violence and 
for guiding interventions. 
Similarly, following a violent incident at a University of North Car-
olina system campus in 2004, in which two students were killed, the 
UNC system conducted a comprehensive review of campus safety is-
sues. In the 2004 final report, the task force recommended that sys-
tem campuses should train faculty and staff to identify and intervene 
with applicants who may pose a danger to the university community. 
Further the campuses should maintain campus safety committees, and 
conduct campus threat assessments to identify sources of threats to 
the campuses (University of North Carolina Office of the President, 
2004). The precipitating case involved an individual that had raised 
concerns during the admissions processes and the recommendations 
were narrowly oriented around persons in the admissions process. 
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This contributed to many of the UNC campuses not implementing 
threat assessment processes until after the incident at Virginia Tech. 
In 2003, The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Ori-
ented Policing Services convened a National Summit on Campus Pub-
lic Safety (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004). The summit report com-
mented on the weak coordination between senior university executives 
and leaders of campus safety and security functions. The report also 
commented on the inconsistency in prevention and security practices 
across campuses, noting that “There are few collective efforts and, as 
such, threat assessment, prevention, and response strategies may dif-
fer significantly” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, p. 38). The report 
noted the lack of any national campus safety resource center to sup-
port information sharing across campuses as contributing to the lack 
of information sharing and awareness of developing practices. The 
summit made several recommendations including campuses adopt-
ing an all-hazards (i.e., regardless of origin or type) approach to pre-
venting and dealing with incidents. The report stated that 
… An all-hazards approach to crisis prevention, response, and 
management enhances the overall coordination of activities among 
responding organizations, improves early warning and notifica-
tion, allows for improved and continued assessment of potential 
consequences, and fosters continuity of operations during and af-
ter a crisis. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, p. 64) 
Since the time of the report, many of the recommendations have 
been implemented, including the formation and operation of a Na-
tional Center for Campus Public Safety. 
In 2006, the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP, 
2006) published professional guidelines for the practice of threat as-
sessment. While not specific to colleges and universities, the guide-
lines represented a basic standard of practice for threat assessment 
and management across sectors. 
Following the Virginia Tech incident, several professional associa-
tions, governmental agencies, and independent bodies reviewed cam-
pus safety concerns and provided recommendations related to cam-
pus safety in general. Many of those also provided recommendations 
or guidance related to threat assessment on campus. 
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Professional Associations 
The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Adminis-
trators (IACLEA), a professional association for campus law enforce-
ment and security directors, conducted a review of campus safety 
concerns. The review included a summary of several violent attacks 
impacting campuses and a summary of the state and system reviews 
then available. The association (IACLEA, 2008) concurred with the 
collective recommendations that 
[i]nstitutions of higher education should have a behavioral threat 
assessment team that includes representatives from law enforce-
ment, human resources, student and academic affairs, legal coun-
sel, and mental health functions. Specifically, campus public safety 
should be included on the team. (IACLEA, 2008, p. 7) 
McBain (2008), writing in the newsletter for the American Associ-
ation of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), noted the challenges 
inherent in attempting to balance student privacy, campus safety and 
public well-being. The AASCU document also provided several basic 
guidelines for institutions including educating faculty and staff about 
lawful information sharing, encouraging students with mental health 
issues to seek assistance, minimizing mental health service gaps in 
the community and on campus, and the development of centralized 
threat assessment teams. 
A survey of 342 campuses conducted in August 2008 found that ap-
proximately two thirds of campuses surveyed had some sort of multi-
disciplinary team to address emotional crises or concerns of faculty, 
staff, or students, with 93% of the teams focused on students. (Cam-
pus Safety & Security Project, 2009). Another 13% of survey respon-
dents were in the process of developing such teams. However, less 
than half of campuses surveyed had an established threat assessment 
team to assess and manage threatening or violent behaviors. Only 
37% of public 2-year campuses had such a team, while approximately 
60% of 4-year campuses had such a team. Another 19% of survey re-
spondents reported that their campus was in the process of develop-
ing such a team. 
In 2010, the ASME Innovative Technologies Institute published an 
independent review and standard regarding campus risk analysis. This 
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American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard addressed 
both natural and human made risks impacting on higher education. 
The standard recommended that “Threat Assessment Teams be put 
into place on campus to help identify potential persons of concern and 
gather and analyze information regarding the potential threat posed 
by an individual(s)” (ASME, 2010, pp. 9 –10). The standard recognized 
model threat assessment management approaches that met guidelines, 
including those outlined in Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, and Savage 
(2008) and Randazzo and Plummer (2009). (see Nolan, Randazzo, & 
Deisinger, 2011 and Deisinger, Randazzo, Marisa, & Nolan, 2014 for 
further discussion of the relevance of ANSI standards informing the 
standard of practice for threat assessment and management.) 
Government Agencies 
Following the Virginia Tech incident, the U.S. Secretaries of Education 
and Health & Human Services, along with the U.S. Attorney General 
provided a report to the President of the United States, outlining sev-
eral recommendations regarding campus safety (Leavitt, Spellings, & 
Gonzalez, 2007). These included the need for: 
• Greater awareness for professionals from various disciplines re-
garding the lawful sharing critical information on persons who 
pose a danger; 
• More effective implementation of violence prevention programs 
and responses to reported threats of violence; 
• Improved awareness for faculty, staff, students, and parents re-
garding warnings signs of violence and mental illness, as well 
as means of reporting concerns; 
• Adequate care for persons with mental illness; 
• Improved research of targeted violence in institutions of higher 
education. 
The last recommendation resulted in a joint project of the United 
States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. 
Department of Education, focused on targeted violence related to cam-
puses (Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010). The report provided 
an analysis of 272 incidents of targeted violence related to U.S. insti-
tutions of higher education between the early 1900s and 2008. The 
report spoke to the role of threat assessment teams in identifying, 
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assessing, and managing threats posed to the campus community. The 
report cautioned that “[b]lanket characterizations, demographic pro-
files, or stereotypes do not provide a reliable basis for making judg-
ments of the threat posed by a particular individual” (Drysdale et al, 
2010, p. 27). 
In response to misunderstanding and misperceptions regarding 
laws related to student privacy, the U.S. Department of Education 
(2007) quickly provided clarity that relevant Federal law, the Fam-
ily Educational Rights Privacy Act (FERPA) provided ample latitude 
to lawfully share otherwise protected information with other educa-
tional officials with a need to know. Further, guidance clarified that 
the law allowed for sharing of relevant information, even outside the 
institution, where public safety concerns existed. In 2008, the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Ed-
ucation (2008) jointly published guidance clarifying issues related to 
the release of educational and treatment records regarding students. 
The guidance document addressed authorized releases of information 
and records in general, and specifically in situations in which a stu-
dent was reasonably believed to be a serious danger to self or others. 
While the incident at Virginia Tech had highlighted how misunder-
standing of privacy laws could limit lawful information sharing, it was 
also important to maintain a focus on assisting students where pos-
sible and balancing the needs, well-being and privacy of the student 
as well as the safety of the student and others who may be impacted 
or harmed by the actions of the student. Several leading organiza-
tions (Higher Education Mental Health Alliance, 2013; JED Foundation, 
2008; National Association of College & University Attorney’s, 2007; 
2014) promulgated guidance to assist campuses with those issues. 
From 2009 to 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Commu-
nity Oriented Policing Services provided 10 training sessions around 
the nation. These sessions were provided at no cost to participants 
and focused on helping colleges and universities to develop and imple-
ment behavioral threat assessment and management program, using 
established practices, supported by research (U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2009; see also 
http://campusthreatassessment.org ). 
In 2013, several agencies of the U.S. Government collaborated to 
provide guidelines regarding prevention, mitigation, response, and re-
covery to mass casualty incidents occurring at institutions of higher 
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education (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). The guidelines rec-
ommended that campuses implement and operate threat assessment 
teams to help identify and intervene with potential threats. 
Paparazzo, Eith, and Tocco (2013) and then the Federal Law En-
forcement Training Centers and Johns Hopkins University (2014) pub-
lished findings from national summits on the prevention of mass ca-
sualty incidents. Both examined the issues and challenges faced by 
organizations across sectors, including higher education. Both rec-
ommended that government entities and organizations “Identify and 
promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent mul-
tiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention” 
(Paparazzo et al., 2013, p. 13). The summits also recommended im-
plementation of community-based approaches (in addition to cam-
pus based) to support effective prevention and intervention efforts. 
Both summits reflected the need for more and better research to in-
form practice. 
Lessons Confirmed and Learned: Research 
As well-publicized attacks at universities resulted in heightened pub-
lic concern regarding targeted violence on college campuses, threat 
assessment was frequently recommended as a strategy of choice for 
the prevention of targeted violence within postsecondary education 
(Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage, 2008; Pollard, Nolan, & Deis-
inger, 2012; Scalora, Simons, & VanSlyke, 2010). Randazzo and Cam-
eron (2012) detailed the evolution of behavioral threat assessment 
processes from the original Secret Service model used to evaluate 
threats against public figures, to its adaptations for workplace set-
tings and United States K–12 schools, to its current configuration in 
colleges and universities. Not surprisingly, threat assessment research 
has followed a similar evolutionary process. 
While much attention has focused upon disgruntled students as 
perpetrators of targeted violence within campuses, several aspects 
of campus are vulnerable to targeted violence, as grievances regard-
ing workplace dismissals, romantic difficulties, and academic con-
flicts have motivated past campus violence (Drysdale et al., 2010; 
Scalora et al., 2010). Cao et al. (2013) described the range of one cam-
pus threat assessment team’s activity. Employees were the subject in 
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21.5% of events, students in 60.2%, and visitors in 18.3%. External 
threats, including assaults, threats, harassment, and stalking com-
prised 49.5% of cases. 
Subsequent to several high-profile incidents of campus targeted vi-
olence (including that at Virginia Tech), the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI), United States Secret Service (USSS), and Department 
of Education conducted a thorough review of open-source material 
regarding campus attacks between 1900 and 2008 (Drysdale et al., 
2010). As expected, these events were rare (i.e., 272 discoverable inci-
dents) and involved different locations and perpetrator characteristics. 
Attacks were perpetrated by students, employees, alumni, and indi-
rect affiliates of the school (e.g., a significant other of a staff member); 
however, around 10% of attacks involved individuals with no known 
connection to the school. Different motivations for the attack were ob-
served, including intimate relationship difficulties (34%), retaliation 
for wrongdoing (14%), response to academic struggles (10%), and 
workplace dismissal or sanction (6%). The majority of incidents in-
cluded indications of planning, as 73% involved the perpetrator tar-
geting specific individuals. Threatening statements, stalking, harass-
ing behavior, and/or physical aggression preceded targeted violence 
in 31% of cases. These preincident actions were observed by family, 
friends, employees, or the target. 
The presence of preincident behavior noted in the campus attacks 
study is consistent with other literature noting leakage of intention 
and preincident indicators of violence in other targeted violence 
contexts (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011). Until recently, limited examina-
tion of preincident behavior was researched within collegiate set-
tings (Hollister & Scalora, 2015; Hollister, Scalora, Hoff, & Marquez, 
2014; Sulkowski, 2011; Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011). As a result, sig-
nificant effort to bystander issues within campuses received signifi-
cant attention. 
Initial research analyzing preincident reporting by collegiate stake-
holders included responses to hypothetical scenarios of threatening 
behavior. A survey of 967 college students responding to vignettes of 
grievances and multiple threats from hypothetical individuals indi-
cated 70% of students were willing to inform authorities (Sulkowski, 
2011). Students possessing trust in campus services and connection to 
campus were more likely to report. Another study included college stu-
dents, faculty, and staff (Hollister et al., 2012) responding to vignettes 
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of concerning behavior. Large variability was seen in willingness to in-
form authorities across situations (i.e., 9%–91% for students; 39%–
100% for faculty/staff), and students, faculty, and staff were more 
willing to inform authorities after viewing multiple behaviors, di-
rect threats, and/or weapons. Moreover, faculty/ staff seemed to have 
higher reporting rates than students regardless of the scenario. 
Recently, information about the prevalence and distribution of cam-
pus preincident behavior observations has been examined (Hollister 
et al., 2014). In a sample of college students, 35% reported viewing 
preincident activity on campus. These individuals did not differ from 
those that had not seen threatening behavior in most measured vari-
ables (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, self-reported delinquency), except 
higher campus connectedness related to an increased likelihood of ob-
serving concerning behavior. Those willing to report had greater trust 
in campus police, less feelings of safety on campus, and less self-re-
ported delinquency. Campus connectedness and peer loyalty did not 
appear to influence willingness to report. Therefore, the observation 
of preincident behavior appeared somewhat frequently in this sam-
ple, and no demographic differences were significantly related to in-
creased likelihood of preincident observance. 
Research efforts assessed reporting activity in response to specific 
preincident behaviors. A general campus sample was asked if they 
had observed an individual displaying any of a range of preincident 
behaviors, and 38% indicated seeing at least one preincident behav-
ior on campus (Hollister et al., 2014). Inquiries about responses re-
vealed these situations are infrequently reported to police (i.e., about 
25% of observers informed authorities). However, concerning specific 
preincident behaviors: instances of acquisition or interest in weap-
ons (43%), suicidal statements or attempts (40%), repetitive face-to-
face contact (37%), and/or assault (36%) were the most frequently 
reported. Situations with vandalism or property theft (22%), threat-
ening statements (25%), and/or threatening gestures were the most 
unlikely to be extended to authorities. 
The attention to bystander issues overlaps with other areas of vio-
lence prevention addressed within collegiate settings. Growing aware-
ness arose of the scope of violence against women on college cam-
puses (Banyard, 2014). As a result, there was a need for campus threat 
assessment activities to potentially assist general campus violence 
prevention. For example, campus threat assessment efforts can also 
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address sexual assault (Paul & Gray, 2011), stalking (Buhi, Clayton, & 
Surrency, 2009), and general criminal activity (Selwyn, 2008) pre-
vention. Spitzberg (2016) noted a range of unwanted pursuit, threats, 
assault, and stalking behavior encountered by college students. Across 
two college student surveys, approximately 14% to 27% of the overall 
student population reported unwanted pursuit or harassment during 
their time on campus. Further 5% to 9% of those surveyed experi-
enced threats, and about 1% experienced physical assault in the con-
text of such harassment episodes (Spitzberg, 2016). 
As with the threat assessment literature, research related to sexual 
and dating violence on college campuses also reveal significant under-
reporting of such victimization by victims (Sabina & Ho, 2014). In a re-
view of 45 empirical articles and reports, Sabina and Ho (2014) found 
that rates of informal disclosure were considerably higher than rates 
of formal disclosure. Recent research has evaluated the impact of by-
stander intervention programs related to sexual assault on campuses 
(Cares et al., 2015; McMahon, Banyard, & McMahon, 2015). Coker et 
al. (2016) performed a multiyear evaluation of a bystander interven-
tion’s campus-level impact on reducing interpersonal violence victim-
ization and perpetration behavior on college campuses. The authors 
found that violence rates were lower on intervention versus com-
parison campuses for unwanted sexual victimization, sexual harass-
ment, stalking, and psychological dating violence victimization and 
perpetration. 
The above detailed research implies that many preincident behav-
iors overlap across multiple areas of violence encountered within 
campuses. Hollister and Scalora (2015) suggest the generalizability 
of campus threat assessment across collegiate bullying, intimate part-
ner, stalking, and workplace violence concerns given the overlap of 
preincident behaviors across various activities. The overlap of pre-
incident behavior for various types of campus violence had been re-
viewed through self-reports from collegiate stakeholders (Hollister 
et al., 2014). Students who observed an individual engaging in pre-
incident behaviors were separated into individuals that encountered 
physical assault, sexual assault, or neither activity. Most participants 
who witnessed preincident behaviors for physical assault (84%) as 
well as those for sexual assault (56%) observed preincident behaviors 
in addition to assault such as physical following, repetitive unwanted 
face-to-face contact, threatening gestures, and threatening statements. 
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Campus Threat Assessment: Today and in the Future 
Over the past 10 years, campus threat assessment and management 
has evolved from a seldom used novelty, to a part of the standard of 
care at institutions of higher education. While there have been no pub-
lished surveys of broad samples of higher education institutions, avail-
able data indicate that the use of campus threat assessment teams is 
much broader now than it was prior to April of 2007. Campus Secu-
rity Report (2014) published their survey of a small sample of cam-
pus from across the country. They found that 94% of campuses sur-
vey had established teams to assess and or intervene with individuals 
who may pose a threat. 
In 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board 
(2012) published an analysis of incidents of targeted violence across 
sectors, and a review of existing approaches to prevent such violence. 
The task force report, despite being titled Predicting Violent Behavior, 
concluded that such prediction was not possible and that prevention 
should be the accepted goal. The task force concluded that behavioral 
threat assessment and management teams offered an effective means 
of prevention, and that improved information sharing was critical to 
the success of those efforts. Of note, the report cited the Virginia Tech 
Threat Assessment Team as an example of a program for consider-
ation by organizations implementing such approaches. Virginia Tech 
had come a long way. 
The threat assessment field was enhanced with the publication 
of the International Handbook of Threat Assessment (Meloy & Hoff-
man, 2014). The editors and contributors providing a comprehensive 
review of the science and practice of threat assessment and manage-
ment across sectors, disciplines, and around the globe. The practice 
of threat assessment and management in educational settings was di-
rectly addressed in four chapters (Deisinger et al., 2014; Hoffmann & 
Zamboni, 2014; Mohandie, 2014; Mohandie & Meloy, 2014) and ref-
erenced in several others. 
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A Final Note and a Dedication 
The field has advanced considerably. The practice of threat assessment 
and management has grown across campuses in the United States. 
Increasingly, that practice is informed and guided by research, of-
ten with active partnerships between practitioners and academics. 
There remains much to do as we work to prevent violence where pos-
sible and to mitigate harm where necessary. But the work done over 
the past 10 years, honors the memory of those at Virginia Tech, and 
across the nation, who have given so very much that we might learn, 
grow and develop. Their memory reminds us all of who and why we 
serve. That memory challenges us to become better as professionals, 
and as a profession. 
This article is dedicated to the memory of the Virginia Tech victims, 
survivors, responders, and community. Ut Prosim. 
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